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STANDING AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
HURDLES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGANTS
In order for a private individual to invoke the judicial power
to determine the validity of government action, he must show that
he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining a direct
harm as a result of that action. This harm is often referred to as
an "injury in fact" as opposed to a more abstract "injury" which
might be suffered by the public generally. It is insufficient for a
person to claim that he has suffered in a manner common to all
members of the public.' If a person seeks to restrain public officers
from acting in excess of their statutory authority, he must demonstrate to the court an injury or threat to a particular legal right of
his own, as distinguished from the public interest in the administration of the law.2 If the required allegations are not made, federal
courts (and most state courts) will find that the person has no standing-no right to litigate the issues-and refuse to hear the case
on its merits.
Standing is a nebulous concept which defies simple explanation.
It has been defined as the "[d]octrine that in [an] action in [a]
federal constitutional court by [a] citizen against a goverment officer, complaining of alleged unlawful conduct there is no justiciable
controversy unless [that] citizen shows that such conduct invades or
will invade a private substantive legally protected interest of plaintiff citizen."' This "definition," taken from a 1943 circuit court
opinion,' provides only a skeletal explanation of what standing is
and little insight into how the standing concept is used by federal
courts as a device for rejecting cases.
The requirement of standing sometimes operates as a selfimposed federal court rule of judicial restraint to avoid deciding
"unimportant" issues,5 while at other times it has been improperly
used to enforce the constitutional requirement that the federal
judiciary limit its decisions to "cases and controversies." 6 In truth,
the rule of standing which denies a plaintiff the right to vindicate
constitutional rights of others who have suffered a general "injury"
1 Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1938).
2 Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
3 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) at 1577.
4 Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1943).
5 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953), reh. den. 346 U.S. 841 (1953).
6 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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is merely a rule of practice of the federal courts. Many years ago,
the U.S. Supreme Court declared:
The requirement of standing is often used to describe the constitutional limitation on the jurisdiction of this Court to "cases and controversies." Apart from the judicial requirement, this court has
developed a complementary rule of self-restraint for its own governance (not often clearly distinguished from the constitutional limitation) which ordinarily precludes a person from challenging [the
propriety of government action] by invoking the rights of others. The
common thread underlying both requirements is that a person cannot
is inchallenge [government 7action] unless he shows that he himself
jured by its operation.
standIn a later decision, the Court emphasized that requirements of
rather
but
ing were "not principles ordained by the Constitution,
proper
be
rules of practice" from which exceptions would always
"where there are weighty countervailing policies. ' 8 Unfortunately,
standing
it is not always easy to distinguish between a court's use of
as
as a constitutional concept as opposed to a rule of practice and,
about
the U.S. Supreme Court recently declared, "generalizations
standing to sue are largly useless as such."'
STANDING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: AN OVERVIEW
alHistorically, taxpayers have not had standing to challenge
v.
Frothingham
In
legedly unconstitutional federal expenditures.
in
interest
°
taxpayer
Mellon' the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
minute, and
federal expenditures is too remote, indeterminate, and
in
taxpayers
with
that any injury suffered by one person is shared
injury
direct
general. Thus, an individual taxpayer had suffered no
to sue.
in fact, but merely a general "injury" and had no standing
self-imposed
In this instance, standing was denied as a matter of
judicial restraint.
and
Forty-five years later the Court distinguished Frothingham
governa
ruled in Flast v. Cohen" that a taxpayer may challenge
proment expenditure if he alleges it is part of a federal spending
to
Referring
gram which exceeds specific constitutional limitations.
Flast
the
the constitutional limitations on federal court judisdiction,
only to whedecision held that "the question of standing is related
in an
ther the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented
7

Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), reh. den. 346

8 U.S. v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960).

U.S. 841 (1953).

v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
9 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations

(1970).
10 262 U.S. 447 (1923).

11 392 U.S. 83, 104 (1968).
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adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution."'1 2 Although the issue litigated was quite
specialized, the Flast decision has contributed greatly to a liberalization
of the law of standing as it affects all litigants.
In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court again considered the problem
of standing when it decided Jenkins v. McKeithen 13 and noted
that
the concept of standing "is surrounded with the same complexities
and vagaries that inhere in [the concept of] justiciability"
in general. 4 The Court reiterated the basic, indispensible requirement
for
standing, laid down in Baker v. Carr,'" that the party seeking
relief
must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."' 6 In Jenkins, the
Court
went on to say that "[i] n this sense, the concept of standing
focuses
on the party seeking relief, rather than on the precise nature
of the
relief sought."' 7 In other words, in determining the matter
of standing a court must focus on who may assert certain contentions
rather
than on what the contentions are.
More recently, in 1970, the U.S. Supreme Court again faced
the problem of standing in two cases decided the same day,
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,
and
Barlow v. Collins,'9 and promulgated a new two-step test for
standing: 1. Does the plaintiff allege "that the challenged action
has
caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise"? 2" 2.
If such
injury is alleged, does "the interest sought to be protected
by the
complainant [lie] arguably within the zone of interests to
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee
in
question" ?21
The "zone of interest" requirement of this latest standing "test"
is clearly out of step with earlier decisions of the Court and
at odds
with the entire concept of standing. The fact that a litigant
alleges
injury in fact under a federal statute due to actions of a government
12 Id.

at 101.

395 U.S. 411 (1969). The opinion was shared by only
three justices; two concurred in the result and three dissented.
14 Id. at 423.
15 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16 Id. at 204.
17 395 U.S. at 423.
18 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
19 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
20 Association of Data Processing Serv.
Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
152 (1970).
21 Id. at 153.
13
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agency or official is sufficient to satisfy the traditional standing test.
A "zone of interest" requirement for standing which goes beyond
this operates as a new rule of self-imposed judicial restraint rather
than as an obligation of the "cases and controversies" constitutional
White, argued vigorlimitation. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
22 because in applying such
ously against the "zone of interest" step
to
a test a court must scrutinize relevant statutory materials "not
that
determine standing but to determine an aspect of reviewability,
review of the
is, whether Congress meant to deny or to allow judicial
23
this wellagency action at the instance of the plaintiff.1 Since
"zone
reasoned dissent has not yet been followed by the Court, the
of interest" test remains part of the law of standing today.
As administrative law expert Professor Kenneth Culp Davis
noted several years ago:
if
A plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action has standing
plainthe
of
right
legal
a
When
stake.
at
is
plaintiff
the
of
a legal right
sometimes
tiff is not at stake, a plaintiff sometimes has standing and
of the
one
for
common,
very
is
reasoning
lacks standing. Circular
questions asked in order to determine whether a plaintiff has standinga
is whether a plaintiff has a legal right, but the question whether
plaintiff has a legal right is the final conclusion, for if the plaintiff
is
has standing his interest is a 24legally-protected interest, and that
right.
legal
a
by
meant
is
what

It is no wonder that the concept of standing is regarded as one
of the most amorphous concepts in the field of law. U.S. Supreme
Court decisions which seem to promulgate new rules and guidelines
are of more practical use in clarifying earlier decisions than in providing substantive rules to be followed by prospective litigants. The
speCourt itself refers to the standing concept as a "complicated
25
cialty of federal jurisdiction.
Fortunately, most state courts treat standing in a less complex
manner. Professor Davis claims that this distinction occurs because
federal courts have evolved a law of standing too complicated for
them to apply consistently, while state courts usually have perceived
in
the merits of the simple proposition that those adversely affected
fact should be allowed to challenge that action which has injured
them.

26

22 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 et seq. (1970). [This dissent covers both
Again, 84 HARv. L. Rxv.
the Data Processing and Barlow cases.] See L. Jaffe, Standing

two most recent cases.
633 (1971), for Prof. Jaffe's comments on these
(1970).

Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 169
24 3 K. DAvis, ADmmisTRAvE LAw TREATiSE 217 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
, JUDICIL CONTROL OF AD3 K. DAvis]; see generally 3 K. DAvis § 22; L. JArE
mIlSTATmVE AcTION 459-545 (1965).
25 U.S. ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
26 3 K. DAvis, 291-92 nn.2 & 3.
23
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The opinion written by Judge Tamm in Scanwell Laboratories,
Inc. v. Shaffer27 provides a fine review of the problem of standing
wherein the court concludes that when Congress lays down guidelines
to be used in carrying out its mandate in some specific area, a
procedure should exist whereby those injured by arbitrary and capricious action of some government agency or official in ignoring those
guidelines may "vindicate their very real interests, while at the
same
time furthering the public interest. '2 Anyone who must face
the
standing barrier would agree that such a procedure should
exist,
but, too often, standing has been denied litigants because federal
courts have found no such procedure.
STANDING FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGANT

It is easy to see that an environmental litigant, injured by some
governmental agency decision, who files a class action in federal
court2 9 could easily find himself in the unfortunate position of
Mrs.
Frothingham if the U.S. Supreme Court had not chosen to expand
and liberalize the law of standing in recent years. Even now, a challenged agency or official will undoubtedly raise the standing issue
along with the traditional claim of sovereign immunity.
Though the environmental litigant must be cognizant of the
problems which standing may present, the U.S. Supreme Court
may
have provided guidance through dictum when it declared, regarding
the question whether the interest alleged by a litigant is arguably
within a federal statute's zone of interests:
That interest, at times, may reflect "aesthetic, conservational,
and
recreational" as well as economic values. [Citations omitted.]
. . . We
mention these non-economic values to emphasize that standing
may stem
from them as well as from . . . economic injury ....
0

The Court further stated that "[w]here statutes are concerned,
the
trend is toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest
424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Id. at 864.
29 Under liberalized Rule 23 of the Code of Federal
Civil Procedure, care must
be exercised in asserting that you are a member of the class
you allegedly represent.
See Environmental Defense Fund v. Hoerner-Waldorf, Civ.
No. 1694 (W.D. Mont.,
dismissed Aug. 27, 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1640:
Because the court has found a basis of standing to bring
a non-class representation action on behalf of a public interest the court
is not
find a class action is maintainable. The requirement that a party required to
be a member
of the
27
28

class it allegedly represents may not be set aside. [Emphasis added.]
I
[Note: B.N.A.'s Environment Reporter: Decisions are cited as E.R.C.]
E.R.C. at 1641.

ao Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 154
(1970).
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81
administrative action." The question remains, who comprises these
classes of people who may protest?
The greatest conservation or environmental victory of the
1960's occurred in the case of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC.8 2 This case, decided long before several recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions which have liberalized the law of standing,
uninheld that the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference (an
connon-profit
of
corporated association consisting of a number
to
standing
had
servationist organizations) and several towns each
would
which
challenge a decision of the Federal Power Commission
on the
have allowed construction of a major hydroelectric project
New
in
west side of the Hudson River at Storm King Mountain
the
York. If allowed to proceed, this project would have destroyed
widely
area
unique aesthetic beauty and historical significance of an
world.""3
the
in
scenery
river
of
pieces
finest
the
of
regarded as "one
proIn granting standing, the court decided that to insure adequate
and
tection of the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational,
recreational aspects of power development by the Commission,
a special
"those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited
class of
the
in
included
be
to
held
be
must
interest in such areas,
8 4 as provided in the Federal Power Act. The
'aggrieved' parties"
to consider
court's ruling required the Federal Power Commission
values,
recreational
and
viable alternatives, the impairment of scenic
the
under
license
a
granting
before
effects on wildlife, and the like
Federal Power Act.
While the principle of Scenic Hudson seems quite clear, subseeach
quent cases seem to have been decided on a case by case basis,
the
of
result
a
is
This
facts.
one requiring analysis of its relevant
perthis
in
guidelines
clear
any
difficulty involved in establishing
as the
plexing area of standing for environmental litigants as well
Court
U.S.
the
of
lead
the
reluctance of other jurisdictions to follow
several
that
note
should
One
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
of a liticases decided before Data Processing and Barlow speak
providing
as
question
in
gant's "interest" in the environmental issue
affecting an
a basis for standing once an injury in fact (an injury
in the ininterest
individual or group) is alleged. Such a personal
with the
confused
be
not
tegrity of the human environment should
of the
provision
current "zone of interest" of a relevant statute
current test for standing.

31

Id. at 154.

941 (1966).
32 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), 1 E.R.C. 1084; cert. denied 384 U.S.
33 354 F.2d at 612.
16
34 Id. at 616. The court was referring to § 313(b) of the Federal Power Act,

U.S.C.A. § 8251(b) (1960).
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Following the Scenic Hudson precedent, Road Review League,
Town of Bedford v. Boyd 5 granted standing to a town, a civic association of residents of the town, two wildlife sanctuaries whose
property would be taken for the road, and a non-profit organization
primarily concerned with community problems involving the location
of roads." 6 Although the plaintiffs were not formal parties to any of
the administrative proceedings, the court concluded that the terms
of the Administrative Procedure Act" as it related to sections of
the Federal Highway Act3 8 were "sufficient under the principle of
Scenic Hudson to manifest a congressional intent that towns, local
civic groups and conservation groups are to be considered 'aggrieved'
by agency action which has allegedly disregarded their interests."3 9
More recently, in West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 41 the court granted standing to a conservation
group because it was "a party who has demonstrated a continuing
conservation aesthetic interest in the welfare of the Otter Creek
Basin."'" In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the government
agency failed to consider aesthetic and conservational purposes set
forth in the several congressional acts applicable to the defendant's
application for a permit to prospect for coal on federal lands.
In another New York case, decided before Data Processingand
Barlow, the court inadvertently applied a "zone of interest" test in
a positive rather than negative manner. The Citizens Committee for
the Hudson River Valley (an unincorporated association of citizens
residing near a proposed expressway), the Sierra Club (a non-profit
national conservationist organization), and the Village of Tarrytown
brought action against the U.S. Secretary of Transportation and
others to enjoin construction of an expressway in Citizens Committee v. Volpe42 and were adjudged to have the requisite standing to
maintain the litigation. The court ruled that when statutes involved
in a controversy are themselves concerned with the protection of
natural, historic, and scenic resources (the statute's "zone of interest"), then a "congressionalintent exists to give standing to groups
interested in these factors and who allege that these factors are not
being properly considered by the agency."4
35

270 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

36

Id.at 652.

37

5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706 (1967).

38 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 101(b), 109(a), 134 (1966).
89 270 F. Supp. at 661. See also 3 K. DAVIS § 22.05 at 225.
40

1971).

Civ. No. 70-82E (N.D. W. Va. June 15, 1970), aff'd, 441 F.2d 232
(4th Cir.

41 Civ. No. 70-82E (N.D. W. Va. June 15, 1970). Transcript
of Opinion of
Judge Maxwell at 96.
42 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), 1 E.R.C.
1096; aff'd 425 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1237.
43 302 F. Supp. at 1092 (emphasis
added).
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In affirming this district court opinion, the circuit court held
that the plaintiffs had evidenced the seriousness of their concern with
local natural resources by the fact that they organized for the purpose of cogently expressing that concern, that the intensity of their
concern was apparent from the great expense and effort they undertook to protect the public interest they believed threatened by the
official action of state and federal governments, and that they
"proved the genuineness of their concern by demonstrating that they
[were] 'willing to shoulder the burdensome and costly process of
44
intervention' in an administrative proceeding." In effect the court
ruled that the concern evidenced by the plaintiffs in the local environment was so great that an injury to that environment would
cause injury in fact to the Citizens Committee and the others.
45
In a Colorado district court action, Crowther v. Seaborg, a
broad grant of standing was made to persons who either owned
property in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear detonation site (one
"resident" lived over thirty miles from the proposed site) or were
merely occasional users of the area. Standing was also granted to
a non-profit public benefit organization, dedicated to the preservation of open space in Colorado, to challenge the right of the Atomic
Energy Commission to authorize use of the area in question for
nuclear testing. Although the petitioners relied upon no specific
federal statutes in support of their claims, the court ruled that it
need cite no authority in support of the proposition that the law
protects interests of persons in their health and safety and that the
logical connection between plaintiffs' "status" as property owners
and occasional residents in the area of the proposed site and the
and safety provided a sufficient basis for
"threat" to their health
46
an actual controversy.

The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin,47 that the consumers' interest in environmental protection may properly be represented by a
membership association with an organizational interest in the problem. In this instance, five conservation groups which engaged in
activities relating to environmental protection (the Environmental
44 425 F.2d at 103.
45 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1969), 1 E.R.C. 1199; aff'd 415 F.2d 737 (10th
Cir. 1969).
46 312 F. Supp. at 1215.
47 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428
(1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); National Students Ass'n v.
Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ; United Federation of Postal Clerks,
AFL-CIO v. Watson, 409 F.2d 462, 469-71 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S.
902 (1969); Citizens Committee v. Simonson, 403 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied 394 U.S. 975 (1969); Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng'rs, Civ.
Ac. No. 2655-69 (D.D.C. Jan. 27, 1971), 1 E.L.R. 20079. [Note: Environmental Law
Institute's Environmental Law Reporter is cited as E.L.R.].
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Defense Fund, National Audubon Society, Sierra Club, West Michigan Environmental Action Council, and the Izaak Walton League of
America, intervenor) challenged the U.S. Department of Agriculture's certification of a pesticide, DDT, and requested that its use
be suspended.
Other environmental litigants have passed the test of standing
in a host of cases throughout the United States, though no common
legal principle or theory of statutory construction exists in all of
them.4" Because of these favorable decisions, it should be well established that the law of standing for environmental litigants is at least
as broad as has been expressed in the preceeding cases. Furthermore,
a demonstrated interest in environmental protection and preservation on the part of individuals or organizations should constitute a
sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a case for them to suffer
"injury in fact" and have standing as "private attorney generals"
to challenge activities they feel are detrimental both to their interests
and the interests of the general public. If this analysis were so, standing would be readily available for the environmental litigant seeking
to challenge governmental action and the problem of standing
would have been overcome. Though various environmental organizations have been granted standing and many cases are presently
pending which involve environmental issues,4 the standing barrier
remains.
48 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
154 (1970). Accord Environmental Defense Fund v. U.S. Department of HEW, 428
F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Citizens Committee v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) ; Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Crowther v. Seaborg,
415 F.2d 737 (10th Cir. 1969); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,
395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968); Nashville 1-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington, 387
F.2d 179, 180-81 (6th Cir. 1967); Delaware v. Pennsylvania New York Cent. Transp.
Co., 323 F. Supp. 487 (D. Del. 1971), 1 E.L.R. 20105; Parker v. U.S., 307 F. Supp.
685 (D. Colo. 1969); Shannon v. U.S. Department of HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809, 821-28
(E.D. Penn. 1968); Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270 F. Supp.
650, 660-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
49 For other cases granting standing to environmentalists, see Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Penn. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1271;
Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1401.
Other cases pending in federal courts where standing is a major issue include:
Alpine Lakes Protection Society v. Hardin, Civ. No. 8885 (W.D. Wash. filed April
14, 1970) [several environmental groups, including the Sierra Club, seek to void a
contract granted by defendants for construction of a heavy duty mining access trail in
the Snoqualmie National Forest]; Association of Northwest Steelheaders v. Corps of
Eng'rs, Civ. No. 3362 (E.D. Wash. filed March 11, 1970) [eight sportsmen and some
conservation groups seek a permanent injunction restraining defendants from building
two dams on the Snake River]; Stewart v. Resor, Civ. No. 70-551 (E.D. Penn. filed
Feb. 24, 1970) [groups and individuals, including the Sierra Club, seek a permanent
injunction to restrain defendants from interfering with Tinicum Marshes and Wildlife
Preserve during construction of Interstate Highway 95]; Ottinger v. Penn. Central,
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REGRESSION IN THE NINTH CIRcUIT

Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard
50
Sierra Club v. Hickel (now Sierra Club v. Morton) and decided
that the Sierra Club had no right to be in court in regard to matters
concerning the Sierra-Nevada Mountains. This decision has placed
the Ninth Circuit squarely in conflict with decisions in several other
circuits and has created a confusion which, hopefully, will be resolved when the U.S. Supreme Court hears the case during the 1971
was granted
Fall Term."' Presently, however, the Sierra Club, which
2 and was granted
DDT1
of
use
the
challenge
to
standing nationally
standing in Colorado to protect a forest

3

and in New York to pre-

4

serve a scenic-historical area,' has no right to be in court in the very
area where the club was founded and wherein it carries on its principal activities. Further irony is provided by the fact that the Sierra
Club, with the advice of its founder John Muir, actually established
some of the present boundary lines of the Sequioa National Park,
a portion of which is involved in the Sierra Club v. Morton contro-

versy. Of course, there are other cases on record in which standing
55
has been denied to environmental litigants, and it seems reasonable

68 Civ. 2838, 68 Civ. 4353 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 8, 1969) [action by N.Y. State Congressman, sportsman's group, and others to restrain Penn. Central from causing or
permitting pollution of the Hudson River by effluents discharged from defendant's
rail yards at Harmon, N.Y.-action stayed pending outcome of Penn. Central bankruptcy hearings].
50 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970) [Judge Hamley concurring
on the merits, but dissenting on the decision Sierra Club lacked standing], cert. granted
401 U.S. 907 (1970) sub nom. Sierra Club v. Morton.
51 In "distinguishing" many of the earlier decisions which granted standing to
environmental litigants, the Ninth Circuit noted that in every case the environmentalists, who asserted no economic injury, were joined with others who did claim economic loss. Because the Sierra Club asserted no economic injury in the Hickel case
and did not join with litigants who claimed some economic loss, the court ruled the
Club had no standing. This twisted bit of judicial "reasoning" fails to take into consideration the basic fact of pleading which requires each potential litigant to meet the
standing barrier individually. A mere aggregation of plaintiffs does not provide them
all with sufficient injury to meet a standing test. A local resident or local property
owner (which the Ninth Circuit claimed the Sierra Club should have joined with in
the suit) would not have standing unless injury were shown. In each environmental
case which the Ninth Circuit "distinguished," standing was granted to the environmental plaintiffs after a careful judicial analysis of their claims. Standing was granted
the environmentalists because of the claims they asserted, not merely because other
parties to the action claimed economic loss. If any environmental plaintiff did not have
standing, he should have been severed from the case, yet this did not happen.
For further critical analysis of the Ninth Circuit's decision on standing in the
Hickel case, see 6 GONZAGA L. REv. 328 (1971).
52 Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970), 1
E.R.C. 1347.
53 Parker v. U.S., 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1163.
54 Citizens Committee v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
55 For example Magnaghi v. Volpe, Civ. No. 70-128 (S.D. Fla. dismissed April
30, 1970) [denying standing to an adjacent property owner representing a class who
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to assume that there have been numerous cases dismissed on the
standing issue at the pleading stage.
In their brief as amicii curiae before the U.S. Supreme Court
in support of the Sierra Club's petition for certiorariin the Hickel
case, the Wilderness Society, Izaak Walton League, and Friends of
the Earth point out some of the grave problems which might occur
if environmentalists lack standing. Because environmental cases
often raise issues which either do not involve or only indirectly involve direct users of a particular area, the protection of wilderness
areas, the survival of rare and endangered species, and the preservation of wildlife refuges, the integrity of natural rivers and the natural
or scenic aspect of landscape all present standing problems to prospective litigants. In situations involving environmental abuses,
persons and groups whose purpose is protection and preservation of
the environment are the only ones who suffer the "injury in fact"
sufficient to undertake litigation.
Those who bring the suits may incidentally be users in that they or
their members have walked, watched and beheld the subject of the
litigation. However, such use is often incidental to the larger purpose
to protect the integrity of the environment. And if the only persons
with standing are users no one will have standing where there is no
present use (such as a suit to preserve the wilderness) or no use is
possible (such as a suit to prevent the chemical poisoning of eagles). 56

Furthermore, "users" themselves may be unwilling to sue if they
are more concerned with possible economic benefits from a proposed action than they are with the resulting environmental loss.
Perhaps local and national conservation organizations are the only
parties who will "represent the national, as opposed to local, interest by opposing development." 57
EFFECT OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION

Administrative Procedure Act
The whole area of standing was greatly aided by passage of
the Administrative Procedure Act"8 [hereinafter referred to as
APA]. As a result of the APA, "[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,
is entitled to judicial review thereof."5 9 Before reaching the merits
sought a permanent injunction prohibiting operation of a jet training airport near
Everglades National Park].
50 Sierra Club v. Morton, cert. granted 401 U.S. 907 (1970), amicii curiae brief
at 6.
57

Id.

58 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-706 (1967)
59 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (1967).

[Particularly pertinent are §§ 701-706].
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in Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,6" the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia conducted an exhaustive review of the APA's legislative history. The court then held that
when a person makes a prima facie showing alleging arbitrary and
capricious abuses of discretion on the part of an agency or official,
6
that person has standing to sue under section 702 of the APA.
Although section 702 refers to parties "aggrieved" rather than
"aggrieved in fact" (analogous to the "injured in fact" test set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Data Processing and Barlow
cases),6 the legislative history of the APA supports the contention
that the words "in fact" were implied, since language to that effect
appears in the reports of both the Senate and House Committees.
The Senate Report states that "[t]his subsection [§ 702] confers
a right of review upon any person adversely affected in fact by
agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute. 63
Though this exact language did not appear in the statute as finally
enacted, the U.S. Attorney General stated that the language of the
Senate Document was reflective of existing law.6
Lending further support to the contention that the APA should
interpreted in favor of those who propose to litigate
liberally
be
under its terms is the statement of the U.S. Supreme Court in
Barlow v. Collins6 5 that it is "only upon a showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent that the courts
should restrict access to judicial review." It seems clearly the
intent of Congress that the APA apply to all situations where a
person aggrieved in fact seeks judicial review regardless of a lack
of legal right or specific statutory language granting judicial review.
Section 701 of the APA67 lists those actions which are not
reviewable and includes situations where "statutes preclude judicial
review" as well as those where "agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law."168 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
60 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
61 Id. at 869.
62 Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
63 S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, 276 (1946) (emphasis added).
64 Id. at 310.
65 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
66 Id. at 167. Stated previously and elaborated upon in Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967), which supports the contention that the APA's
"generous review provisions" must be given a "hospitable interpretation." See also
Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380 (1962).
67 5 U.S.C.A. § 701 (1967).
68 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (1967).
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Sixth Circuit addressed itself to the question of agency discretion
in Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. U.S., 69 and ruled:
A court may not review a decision committed to the discretion of an
agency pursuant to a permissive type statute, but may do so where

the decision was made pursuant to a mandatory type statute even
70

though the latter decision involves some degree of discretion.

Many of the congressional acts which environmentalists call
upon in support of their claims of improper agency action contain
a list of mandatory factors to be considered by the agency prior
to its action. 71 Since these factors are sometimes ignored, the challenged agency may become subject to judicial review. In reference
to this point, the court in Citizens Committee v. Volpe held:
The rule, therefore, is that if the statutes involved in the controversy
are concerned with the protection of natural, historic and scenic resources, then a congressional intent exists to give standing to groups
interested in these factors and who allege that these factors are not
72
being properly considered by the agency.

The circuit court, in affirming, elaborated upon rights of environmental litigants to invoke review provisions of the APA, holding
that there can no longer be any question that Congress intended

the APA to guarantee comprehensive review of a "broad spectrum
of administrative actions," which include those made reviewable
by specific statutes as well as those actions for which no review is

available under any other statute.78
Indeed, many other courts have found environmental litigants
to be "aggrieved" persons under the terms of the APA, 74 but the
69 395 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1968).
70 Id. at 358.

71 The following is a partial list of congressional acts relied upon by environmentalists in support of claims that they have been "aggrieved by agency action within
the meaning of a relevant statute:" 16 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1960) [National Park Service
conservation requirement]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 528-529 (Supp. 1971) [Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 580(m) & (n) (Supp. 1971) [conservation guidelines for Corps of Eng'rs in reservoir development]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 661, 662(a),
668(a) & (b) (1960) [Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act]; 16 U.S.C.A. § 695(k)
(Supp. 1971) [regarding migratory waterfowl]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 701 et seq. (1960)
[Migratory Bird Act]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 757(a)-(f) (Supp. 1971) [Anadromous Fish
Conservation Act]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 760(a)-(g) (1960) [for migratory game fish
protection]; 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 803(a) et seq. (1960) [Federal Power Act]; 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1131 et seq. (Supp. 1971) [Wilderness Act]; 16 U.S.C.A. § 1271 (Supp. 1971)
[Wild and Scenic Rivers Act]; 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 401-406(k) (1970) [Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899]; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4347 (Supp. 1971) [National Environmental Policy
Act]; 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1651(b)(2), 1653(f) (Supp. 1971) [Department of Transportation Act].
72 302 F. Supp. at 1092 (emphasis added).
73 425 F.2d at 102. Referring to Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 140 (1967). See also S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945) ; H.R. REP.
No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946).
74 Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., Civ. No. 70-82E (N.D.
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Ninth Circuit held that the Sierra Club was not sufficiently "aggrieved" or "adversely affected" to qualify as a litigant under the
75
APA's generous provisions. The court ruled that "[t]he right
it, simply beto sue does not inure to one who does not possess
76
it."
assert
to
willing
else
one
no
is
cause there
Fortunately for those groups or individuals who seek preservation and restoration of environmental quality, the Ninth Circuit
represents a minority view. However, it is a view that will continue to inhibit protection of the environment within the Ninth
Circuit's jurisdiction which includes almost eighty percent of all
77
federally-owned land in the United States. Hopefully, as Professor Davis urges, the U.S. Supreme Court will make a full-scale
inquiry into the legislative history of the APA's provisions on standing when it decides the Sierra Club v. Morton case and will rule
that the APA applies to all situations where a party who is in fact
78
aggrieved seeks judicial review.
National Environmental Policy Act
Section 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of
196971 [hereinafter referred to as NEPA] requires federal agencies
s0
to prepare an environmental impact statement for any "major"
agency actions significantly affecting environmental quality. There
is strong support for the proposition that this section acts as an
amendment to all existing federal legislation to the effect that all
"policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall
in accordance with the policies
be interpreted and administered
'
18
set forth in this Act.'

232 (4th Cir.
W. Va. June 15, 1970) [opinion of the Court at 80, 89-98], aff'd 441 F.2d
(M.D.
1971); Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238, 244
397
Camp,
v.
Organizations
Serv.
Processing
Data
of
Penn. 1970). See also Association
disU.S. 150, 153 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 165-67 (1970) [general
cussion of APA review provisions].
75 Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 32 (9th Cir. 1970).
76 Id.
77 PUBLIC LAND LAW REvIEw COs

.SSION,

ONE TIRD OF T=E NATION'S LAND:

The total
A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS, Appendix F at 327 (1970).

amount of federally-owned land in states within the Ninth Circuit comprises 68.6696
of the total land area of those states. 78.46% of all federally-owned land in the United
States lies within the Ninth Circuit.
78 K. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 450, 462
L.
(1970). For a very thorough discussion of the APA, see Comment, 41 U. COLO.
standing
REv. 96 (1969). For comments regarding the difference of opinion regarding
between Professors Davis and Jaffe, see 6 GONZAGA L. REv. 328 (1971).
79 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4347 (Supp. 1971).
80 As one might imagine, there are considerable differences of opinion between
that
environmentalists and federal agencies as to what constitutes such a major action
prepared.
be
must
an impact statement
81 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp. 1971). See also Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm.,
Inc. v. AEC, Nos. 24,839 & 24,871 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 1971).
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R. Frederic Fisher, a San Francisco attorney who specializes
in administrative and conservation law and is a director of the
Sierra Club Legal Committee, suggests that environmentalists should
present the following argument:
Any time a federal statute grants discretion to a federal agency,
either to license a private activity or to embark on a federal project or

as to how a federal project should be administered or run or go for-

ward, that discretion must be exercised consistently with NEPA policy
to the fullest extent possible. If NEPA does not require this conclusion,
what did Congress mean, then, when it said "to the fullest extent possible?"

82

Using such a rationale, it should be possible to secure judicial review
of matters committed to agency discretion by law at least to the
extent that an agency decision has disregarded any NEPA requirements.
The theory that NEPA leads to substantive conclusions rather
than a mere requirement that federal agencies perform cursory
environmental studies is given additional support in provisions of
the Guidelines for Federal Agencies under the National Environmental Policy Act 88 (issued by the Council on Environmental

Quality, the "enforcement agency" created by NEPA). The guidelines require that agencies considering major actions which will
significantly affect the environment conduct environmental studies
(pursuant to preparation of the NEPA-required impact statement)
in such a way as to insure "that adverse effects are avoided and
environmental quality is restored or enhanced, to the fullest extent
practicable." 84 It is quite possible (since NEPA is presently being
strengthened through judicial interpretation) that courts will decide
this language imposes a requirement on agencies to necessarily follow the conclusions reached by the studies NEPA forces them to
make which have the least adverse effect on the environment.
Significantly, sections 102A, C, and D of NEPA 5 have already
become the subjects of successful litigation against noncomplying
agencies,8 6 and NEPA provisions have been successfully pleaded
82 R. Frederic Fisher, Environmental Issues and Administrative Agencies
Practice,
an address before the National Conference on Environmental Law, San Francisco,
California, Nov. 7, 1970. Mr. Fisher was quoting from section 102 of NEPA, 42
U.S.C.A. § 4332 (Supp. 1971). See also S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14-19
(1969).
83 36 Fed. Reg. 1398 (Jan. 28, 1971).
84 36 Fed. Reg. 1398, § 2 at 1398 (Jan. 28, 1971). Further support for
this contention is found in Senator Jackson's comments regarding NEPA at 115 CoNo. REC.
17,451 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1969).
85 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4332(A), (C) & (D) (Supp. 1971).
86 Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, Nos. 24,839 & 24,871
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before one court to provide review of an agency contract entered
into before the Act's passage.87 On the other hand, the court in
88
Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett concluded that
NEPA did not apply to a contract for a federally-funded project
89
signed prior to the passage of NEPA. Section 11 of the Guidelines
and the intent of NEPA, however, support the conclusion that the
Act applies retroactively.
The environmental litigant has at his disposal, therefore, a
congressionally-inspired tool in the form of NEPA which will become whatever the courts, agencies, and concerned environmentalists shape it into. The Act has exciting and far-reaching potential
for interpretation into an "environmental bill of rights."
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

Most agency defendants in environmental lawsuits automatically raise the defense that the action is an unconsented-to suit
against the sovereign, while challenging the court's jurisdiction
over other substantive matters at the same time. The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that an appropriate inquiry into the matter of
sovereign immunity does not involve questions of the substance
of the cause of action at all, since such an inquiry "confuses the
doctrine of sovereign immunity with the requirement that the
plaintiff state a cause of action."9 In determining the question of
sovereign immunity the court must ask only whether it is deprived
of personal jurisdiction over the defendants because of their relationship to the sovereign. The question of personal jurisdiction
must be considered thoroughly and carefully, for the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled long ago in U.S. v. Lee9 that immunity seems opposed
to all the principles upon which the rights of the citizen, when in
conflict with acts of the government, must be determined. The
Court reasoned that when such conflict occurs, the only legal protection a citizen has for his rights which have been invaded by
officers of the government, professing to act in its name, is the
the citizen
review offered by judicial tribunals. The other alternative
92
has is resistance, which may amount to a crime.
(D.C. Cir. July 23, 1971); Wilderness Society v. Hickel, Civ. No. 928-70 (D.D.C.
April 23, 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1355.
87 Sierra Club v. Laird, Civ. No. 70-78 (D. Ariz. filed May 25, 1970), preliminary
inj. granted June 23, 1970.
88 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Penn. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1271, 1279.
89 36 Fed. Reg. 1398, § 11 at 1400 (Jan. 28, 1971).

90 Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 692-93 (1949).
91 106 U.S. 196 (1882).

92 Id. at 218-19.
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Typically, an agency or official will file a motion to dismiss
upon the ground that the suit is in substance and effect one against
the United States, which has not consented to be sued or waived
its immunity from suit. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has
declared that there are two well-recognized exceptions to the doctrine that "the sovereign is immune.""
Those exceptions are (1) action by officers beyond their statutory
powers and (2) even though within the scope of their authority, the
powers themselves or the manner in which they are exercised are constitutionally void. [Citation omitted.] In either of such cases, the
officer's action "can be made the basis of a suit for specific relief against
the officer as an individual . . . ." [Citation omitted.] 94

In following this reasoning, it seems evident that the allowable
scope of judicial inquiry into sovereign immunity is limited to
the allegations stated upon the face of the complaint itself and
that the inquiry must extend only into the jurisdictional basis for
the litigation, not into the merits of the cause of action as a whole.
In Carter v. Seamons,9" the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
declared that courts have adopted the procedure, for jurisdictional
purposes, of accepting at face value the averments of the complaint
unless they are so patently inconsequential or frivolous as to afford
no possible basis for jurisdiction, thus avoiding a decision on the
merits under the guise of resolving preliminary jurisdictional issues.
In the Carter case, the court found the claims to be affirmative and
explicit and not insubstantial or frivolous. Accepting the plaintiff's
contentions as true, merely for jurisdictional purposes, the court
ruled that the case, sub judice, was not against the United States,
but merely an action to compel a government agency official to perform a clear legal duty. Thus, the defense of sovereign immunity
was not allowed. 6
Basically, court decisions have held that when an administrator
is accused of an abuse of discretion or of acting ultra vires, sovereign immunity cannot be raised successfully as a defense, for the
person is not acting in behalf of the sovereign, but merely as an
individual abusing the powers granted him by the sovereign. 7
9S Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963). Accord Malone v. Bowdoin,
369 U.S. 643 (1962); Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949);
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 233 U.S. 605 (1912); U.S. v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882);
Carter v. Seamons, 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp.
1205 (D. Colo. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1199.
04 Dugan v. Rank, 382 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963).
95 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969).
96 Id. at 770.
97 See also Parker v. U.S., 307 F. Supp. 684, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970)
[holding that an administrator is bound by his agency's own regulations]; Abbott
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Another basis for rejection of the defense of sovereign immunity
is provided for claims which are based upon jurisdiction under the
Administrative Procedure Act."' The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled in Estrada v. Ahrens9" that when Congress provided judicial
review in actions brought by "any person adversely affected or
aggrieved by any agency action," it expressly authorized suits which,
if ordinary tests were applied, would be barred as unconsented-to
suits against the government and that "[tlhe Act thereby makes
a clear waiver of sovereign immunity in all actions to which it
applies." 0 Congress' declaration that judicial review of agency
action is available to those aggrieved thereby leads to the inescapable
conclusion that there exists a congressional intent to waive the defense of sovereign immunity. Any other interpretation of the Admin10
istrative Procedure Act makes its review provisions chimerical. '
Although the defense of sovereign immunity appears in almost
all cases where environmentalists challenge agency action, most
courts realize the necessity of making agency decision-makers responsive to challenges by a concerned citizenry and reject agency
attempts to hide behind the sovereign's cloak. Hopefully, the
thoughts which Justice Douglas expressed in his dissent in Malone
v. Bowdoin'012 will attain universal acceptance in the U.S. courts:
"Sovereign immunity has become more and more out of date as
the powers of the Government and its vast bureaucracy have increased."'0 As rejection of this defense becomes more widespread,
we may look for agency decisions which, because of the spectre
Laboratories v. Celebrezze, 228 F. Supp. 855 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd sub nom. Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
98 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-706 (1967).
99 296 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1961).
100 Id. at 698. See also Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29, 34-35 (9th Cir. 1958);
Powelton Civic Home Owners Ass'n v. U.S. Department of HUD, 284 F. Supp. 809,
834 (E.D. Penn. 1968); 3 K. DAvis 434-47 n.2; H. Hart and H. Wechsler, The New
Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARV. L. REV. 929 (1968).
101 For support for this contention, see Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer,
424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970) ; Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair, 313 F. Supp. 1312
(D. Minn. 1970); Crowther v. Seaborg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970); Parker
V. U.S., 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970); West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v.
Island Creek Coal Co., Civ. No. 70-82E (N.D. W. Va. June 15, 1970), aff'd 441 F.2d
232 (4th Cir. 1971).
But see Magnaghi v. Volpe, Civ. No. 70-128 (S.D. Fla. dismissed May 7, 1970)
[dismissed due to lack of standing as well as sovereign immunity]. Though many
courts have held that a waiver of sovereign immunity occurs when a state becomes
active in a field subject to federal regulations, see Pennsylvania Environmental Council,
Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Penn. 1970) [dismissing the complaint only
as to state secretary of highways, several contractors and other instrumentalities of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on sovereign immunity grounds].
102 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
103 Id. at 652. For a good discussion of Malone and other cases, see Izaak Walton
League v. St. Clair,313 F. Supp. 1312, 1314-15 (D. Minn. 1970), 1 E.R.C. 1401.
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of judicial rebuff, are more responsive to the public good rather
than to the special interests of a select few. Presently, however,
sovereign immunity remains as another threshold barrier to judicial
review of agency action which environmentalists must overcome.
CONCLUSION

Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have brought litigants
a long way from a narrow standing test based primarily on a "legal
interest" concept. There is hope that future decisions of the Court
will accept the position of Justices Brennan and White that "injury
in fact" should be the sole test of a federal court litigant's standing.Y4 Until such a decision is made, however, we must stumble
through a morass of cases which, while they provide clues as to
how to present allegations in support of a right to standing, cannot provide assurance that an environmental litigant will have
standing to adjudicate very real injuries to the interests of the group
he represents or the public in general. Imposition of the additional
"zone of interest" test causes needless confusion.
Professor Davis suggests an alteration of the "zone of interest"
test that would make it a useful tool rather than a burden. He
suggests that "[a] person whose legitimate interest is injured in
fact should have standing unless congressional intent is discernible
that the interests he asserts is not to be protected."' ° If the Davis
view were adopted, plaintiffs would not be required to plead that
they fall within a statute's purview, but the burden would be shifted
to the defendant to assert that the statute was not intended to provide review. A "test" thus phrased in positive terms would be well
suited to the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure
Act and would help to eliminate the type of "forum shopping" which
forces a litigant to challenge government agencies in the more favorable jurisdiction of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rather than in federal courts within the domain
of more rigid or "hostile" circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit.
The object of the law is, or should be, to allow the airing of
grievances as it administers justice. Present complexities which
surround the amorphous concept of standing create artificial barriers to justice which should be removed. Once a person or group
has alleged that his legitimate interest has been injured in fact
by improper action of an agency or official, he should be granted
104 Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 168 (1970).
105 K. Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Cm. L. RaV.
450, 472

(1970).
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standing to pursue a judicial determination of the merits of his
allegation in the federal courts.
One might ask what is a "legitimate interest" of an environmental litigant or how such a person or group may be "injured
in fact" when no monetary loss is alleged. A businessman is "injured in fact" when agency action causes him economic loss.
Similarly, a local resident or property owner may suffer economic
loss when adversely affected by agency decisions. The environmental
litigant suffers no such economic damage, yet as an individual or
representative of a group with an interest in the protection and
preservation of the human environment, he is "injured in fact"
when the integrity of our environment is degraded. In truth, the
entire nation is "injured" when environmental degradation occurs,
but a person or group with an avowed purpose or "interest" in
the protection of the environment for the enjoyment of present
and future generations suffers most acutely. Justice requires that
the environmental litigant be heard in our courts.
In the same interest of justice, the Administrative Procedure
Act and judicial decisions should resoundingly defeat the claim of
sovereign immunity whenever it is raised as a defense in litigation
which alleges illegal agency or official action.
As more and more of our lives and our environment are affected
by federal agency decisions, it becomes increasingly important that
individuals and groups have the right to appear in court to challenge
allegedly illegal agency actions which have caused them injury. The
ideal of a bureaucracy which is responsive to the public it serves demands no less. It will not be sufficient in future years to try to
rectify today's mistakes; we must act today to assure that the
mistakes are not made. Judicial review of government action is
one sure method of preventing mistakes.
Peter Heiser, Jr.

